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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 990146-CA

v.
KEVINA.BOSLEY,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of forgery, third degree felonies
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

A.
Where the evidence was clear as to whom defendant
intended to defraud, did the trial court err in failing to instruct
the jury that to convict defendant of forgery, it must find that he
intended to defraud a specific person or persons?
B.
Where the jury was instructed that conviction for forgery
required the jury to find that defendant acted with a "purpose to
defraud/9 did the trial court err in failing to also instruct the
jury that defendant's conduct must be "intentional?"

"An appeal... claiming that a jury instruction incorrectly states the law presents a
question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988,989-90
(Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993)). "Even if
we find an error, however, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable
probability the error affected the outcome of his case." Tinoco. 860 P.2d at 990 (citing
State v.Garrett 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) provides as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone,
or with knowledge that he is facilitating afraudto be perpetrated by
anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making,
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference,
publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of third degree-felony forgery under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (R. 1-2). On November 10, 1998, a jury found defendant
guilty as charged (R. 41). The trial court sentenced him on December 21,1998 to two
concurrent 0-5 year prison terms (R. 81). The court stayed execution of the sentences and
placed defendant on probation, but ordered him confined to the Box Elder County jail
2

pending a mental health evaluation (R. 81-82). The court also ordered defendant to pay
restitution, fines, surcharges, and attorney fees (R. 82).
Defendant filed a Motion for A New Trial on December 29,1998 (R. 85). The
trial court denied the motion by memorandum decision on February 4,1999 (R. 109-10).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 114).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 7,1997, two stolen checks were placed in the night deposit box at
Members First Credit Union in Brigham City for deposit in defendant's account (R. 3-4).
The first check, in the amount of $5,000, was drawn on the account of Foxmoor
Apartments, and was payable to Barbara Pledger. The name "David N. Henrie" was
written on the back of the check (R. 153:3-5). The second check, for $250, was drawn on
the account of William Mercer, payable to Elizabeth Workman, and ostensibly endorsed
by Ms. Workman (R. 153:10). The checks had been stolen from David Henrie and
William Mercer (R. 153:12-13).
Unaware that the checks had been stolen, the credit union called defendant and
asked him to come in and sign the checks (R. 3).1 Defendant returned to the credit union
and endorsed the checks with his name (id.). The credit union deposited the checks into

Although 12 witnesses testified at trial, the record contains the testimony of only
one witness: investigating officer William Scott Cosgrove (R. 40-41,153). Therefore, in
order to give continuity to this Statement of Facts, some of the facts in this paragraph are
taken from the Affidavit in Support of Warrant of Arrest at R. 3-4.
3

defendant's account (id). On July 14, defendant withdrew $4,500 from the account (R.
4). When credit union employees came to suspectfraud,they notified police (R. 153:3).2
Detective William Scott Cosgrove questioned defendant at defendant's home in
Corinne (R. 153:5). Defendant admitted that he had signed the names of David Henrie,
Barbara Pledger, William Mercer, and Elizabeth Workman on the checks (R. 153:12,2527,30-32). He acknowledged that he did not know any of the people whose names he
had signed (R. 153:9-11,26).
As Detective Cosgrove recalled his conversation with defendant, "I said[,] who put
these names on the checks and he says I did. I asked him why and he says, well, some
friend owed me money for doing some work. I asked him who these friends are so I
could contact them. He said that he could not recall their names. I said, well, where can I
locate these friendsf?] He come up with a story that they fish on theriverthere in
Corinne. I could possibly locate them there" (R. 153:9-10).
Defendant was convicted (R. 81). In his Motion for a New Trial, he asserted that
his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance because she failed to obtain the
services of a handwriting expert to testify that defendant had not written the fronts of the
stolen checks, and because she failed to submit a jury instruction requiring that "the act to
defraud [must] be done intentionally or knowingly" (R. 89,93).

2

The record does not indicate when or how the credit union became aware of the

fraud.
4

The trial court rejected defendant's claims:
Defendant now argues that a handwriting expert should have been
procured to offer evidence indicating that defendant did not write those
checks. An analysis of the prosecution's evidence will show that the
prosecution witness did not claim that defendant wrote the checks. Rather,
he claimed that defendant "admitted writing the checks."
. . . Under the law, it is not necessary that the State prove the
defendant wrote the checks
The opinion now proffered by the defense
that a forensic expert has concluded defendant "probably did not produce"
the writing on the front of the checks is unremarkable. There is no evidence
to suggest this jury concluded the defendant wrote the front of the checks.
The jury did not need to even decide that issue. The jury was made well
aware of that through the questions which were issued by the jury and the
answers provided. The jury's second question was, "What does it mean to
utter a check?" The response given to the jury was "utter means to put or
send into circulation"
Trial defense counsel's decision not to secure an expert regarding
handwriting samples was sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.
The second argument appears to be that the failure to provide an
instruction concerning intent, as propounded by current defense counsel,
constituted ineffective assistance. The Court has reviewed the instructions
and concludes that the jury was properly and sufficiently instructed
concerning intent
Defense counsel now argues that there is no indication to the jury
that the defendant must have intended to defraud. Black's Law Dictionary
Revised Fourth Edition, defines "intent" as follows:
"Intent. Intent in [the] legal sense is purpose to use particular
meant to effect certain result... meaning, purpose,
signification, intendment"
Black's Law Dictionary further defines "purpose" and "purposely" as
follows:
"Purpose. That which one sets before him to accomplish, an
end, intention, or aim..."
"Purposely. Intentionally, designedly, consciously,..."
The words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court
concludes that they are, therefore, for purposes of this offense and these
5

instructions synonymous. The jury was properly instructed concerning
intent.
The defendant has not shown a legal basis for a new trial and the
Motion is denied.
(R. 109-10 (emphasis in original), Addendum A).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the
crime of forgery requires afindingthat defendant had the specific intent to defraud a
particular person or persons. Since defendant failed to preserve this claim, the Court
should refuse to reach it. On the merits, however, since the evidence was clear as to
whom defendant intended to defraud, no instruction setting forth the victims' names was
necessary.
Defendant further asserts that the jury should have been instructed that, in order to
convict defendant, it must find that his conduct was intentional or knowing. In fact, the
jury was instructed on the mens rea element of the crime with the exact language used in
the statute. Because the jury instructions mirrored the statutory language, they correctly
stated the law.
Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his attorney did not request a jury instruction on specific intent. On the merits, since the
trial court did not err, trial counsel did not perform deficiently. However, since defendant
failed to provide an adequate record or to adequately brief this issue under rule 24, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court should refuse to reach this claim.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THE MENS REA ELEMENT OF FORGERY
Defendant asserts that "[i]n the present action, there was obviously confusion by
the jury as to what exactly constituted intent." Appellant's Brief at 9. On appeal,
defendant asserts two claims regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury on intent.
First, defendant claims that under State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995), the
trial court should have instructed the jury that it must find that defendant had specific
intent to defraud a particular person. Appellant's Brief at 6. Second, defendant claims
that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that defendant's conduct must be
"intentional" to support a conviction. Appellant's Brief at 7-8.
A.

Defendant Waived his Claim that the Trial Court was Required to
Instruct the Jury that the Crime of Forgery Requires Specific Intent
Defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that in order to

convict defendant, it must find that he intended to defraud a specified person or persons.
This claim is raised for the first time on appeal. When defendant challenged the trial
court's jury instructions in his motion for a new trial, his sole ground for doing so was
that the jury instruction did not specify any culpable mental state (R. 92-93). Defendant
did not claim, as he does on appeal, that the trial court was required to instruct the jury

7

that it must find that defendant intended to defraud a particular person in order to convict
him.
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c), "[n]o party may assign as error any
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury in
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground for his
objection." Rule 19(c) "requires that the matter excepted to and the ground therefor be
distinctly stated/ State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 59L 594 (Utah 1988V "Where no grounds are
apparent from the text of the instruction and no objection is stated, the objection is
presumed waived." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State
v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986)); see also State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120
(Utah 1989).
Under general principles of appellate review, it is well settled that a claim of error
must be specifically presented to the trial court in a timely manner to preserve the issue
for appeal. State v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997); State v. BeltranFelix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996). "[Ijissues not raised at trial cannot be argued
for the first time on appeal." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). As the
Utah Supreme Court has stated,
A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims
of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate
court will review such claim on appeal. Importantly, the grounds for the
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated.

8

State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). It is a "long-established policy [of appellate review] that the trial court should
have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d
1107,1109 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993)). Here,
the trial court had no such opportunity.
Since defendant failed either to preserve this claim or to demonstrate manifest
injustice, the Court should not address it.
B.

On the Merits, the Jury Instructions Given at Trial Followed the Forgery
Statute and Accurately Stated the Mens Rea of Forgery,
Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's waiver of this issue, the claim fails

because the instructions accurately informed the jury of the requisite mental state for
forgery.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999) provides that "[e]very offense not involving
strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." The
statute defining the offense of forgery specifies a culpable mental state by requiring a
"purpose to defraud anyone, o r . . . knowledge that [the defendant] is facilitating afraudto
be perpetrated by anyone." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999).

9

The jury instructions defendant maintains were inaccurate contained the following
language:
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery, a
felony of the 3rd Degree, you must find each of the following elements of
that crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

3.
4.

COUNTI
That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley
On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County,
Utah,
Did with a purpose to defraud,
Utter a check in the amount of $5000

5.

On which the name of the maker had been forged.

1.
2.

(R. 54, jury instruction no. 4, Addendum B). The instruction regarding Count II of the
information was identical except for the amount of the check (R. 55, jury instruction no.
5, Addendum B). Both instructions provided that the mental state required was "purpose
to defraud."
Since "purpose to defraud" is one of the culpable mental states specified in the
forgery statute, the jury was instructed in accordance with the applicable statute. Utah's
appellate courts have held that jury instructions correctly state the applicable law to the
extent that they track the relevant statutory language. See, e.g.. State v. Cripps. 692 P.2d
747, 748 (Utah 1984); State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
Squire, 888 P.2d 1102,1104 (Utah App. 1994); State v.Lopez. 789 P.2d 39,45 (Utah
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App. 1990). Since instruction nos. 4 and 5 followed the language of the forgery statute,
they correctly stated the law.
Defendant relies on State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) to support
his argument that a correct instruction required language that defendant intended to
defraud "anyone." However, because Winward presented distinctive factual
circumstances, its holding does not apply here.
Emer Winward, together with his real estate-agent wife, arranged for ownership
of a piece of real property to change hands three times in a single day. Winward. 909
P.2d at 910-11. The complex series of transactions resulted in a net profit of nearly
$5000 to the first buyer, Nicole Packer. Id. at 911. The title company through which the
transactions were completed issued a check payable to Packer. Unknown to Packer,
defendant collected the check, forged Packer's name on it, and deposited it in his wife's
account. Id. At Winward's forgery trial, the prosecution introduced evidence suggesting
that Winward intended to defraud numerous parties, including Nicole Packer, the
original sellers, the final buyers, the realty company through which the property was
listed, and Mrs. Winward's credit union. Id. at 911-12.
This Court noted that "the State need not prove exactly who the defendant
intended to defraud, provided the State can prove that the defendant acted with the
requisite intent to defraud." Id. at 912. However, the Court held that since "the only

11

person that defendant could possibly have intended to defraud by engaging in this
conduct was Nicole Packer/' the trial court erred in admitting evidence suggesting that
Winward had committed wrongful acts against the other entities. Id. at 913. The Court
further held that the trial court's error in admitting the extraneous evidence was
"compounded by the court's refusal to instruct the jurors that... they must find that
when he signed Packer's name to the check, Winward possessed the specific intent to
defraud Packer." Id. at 913-14. The Court stated:
Absent an instruction that carefully and precisely defined specific intent to
defraud—and, most importantly, conveyed to the jury that, based on the
facts of this case, the only person that defendant could possibly have
intended to defraud when he endorsed Nicole Packer's name on the
checkwas Nicole Packer—the jury lacked the properframeworkwithin
which it could meaningfully evaluate the necessary elements of the crime
charged.
Id.
Recognizing that the facts in Winward were unique, the Court carefully qualified
its holding:
Had the court correctly instructed the jury on the need to find a specific
intent to defraud, it might well have minimized the confusing and
misleading effects of the problematic evidence by narrowly focusing the
jury on the pivotal issue in the case. By the same token, if the evidence was
well-focused, making clear that if defendant intended to defraud anyone bv
his unauthorized endorsement it would have to have been Packer, the jury
instructions could have been less precise.
Id. (emphasis added). The underlined hypothetical illustrates exactly the situation
present in this case. Here, the record does not indicate, and defendant has not argued,

12

that evidence was presented to imply that defendant had any purpose to defraud anyone
other than David Henrie and Elizabeth Workman, from whom the checks were stolen (R.
153:12-13). It was unnecessary for the jury to be instructed that defendant had a purpose
to defraud Workman and Henrie because the evidence did not support an inference that
he intended to defraud anyone else. The potential for confusion of the issues noted in
Winward does not exist here. Therefore, the general proposition stated in Winward that
"the State need not prove exactly who the defendant intended to defraud, provided the
state can prove that the defendant acted with the requisite intent to defraud," id. at 912,
applied, and the jury instruction given was appropriate.
C.

"Purpose" Means "Intent*
Defendant also appears to argue that the trial court trial court erred in failing to

instruct the jury that defendant's utterance of the forged checks must have been
"intentional" to constitute forgery.3 Appellant's Brief at 7-8.
Here, as stated, the culpable mental state for forgery is specified in the forgery
statute. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102, the applicable mens rea for forgery is
"purpose to defraud." Since the jury instructions contained that language, trial court was
not required to provide an additional mens rea instruction.

3

Since defendant did not object to the jury instructions until after trial, this claim
was waived under Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c). However, since the trial court reached the
merits of defendant's post-trial challenge to the jury instruction, the State, for purposes of
this appeal, will not argue waiver.

13

In any event, "intent" and "purpose" have the same meaning. The trial court,
after noting the definitions of "intent" and "purpose" in Black's Law Dictionary, ruled
that "[t]he words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court concludes
that they are, therefore, for purposes of this offense and these instructions synonymous."
(R. 110 (emphasis in original), Addendum A). The trial court was correct under this
Court's precedent. 4"[I]ntent' and 'purpose' are synonymous

6

[P]urpose' is the

same as 'intent.'" State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994).
Since the jury was instructed that forgery required a "purpose to defraud," it
would have been redundant for the court to further instruct the jury that defendant's
conduct must also be "intentional." Although defendant claims error because "the jury
did not have the advantage of the language of Black's Law Dictionary in the
instructions," the jury did not need a dictionary definition of the word "purpose." The
term is commonly understood. "Ordinarily, non-technical words of ordinary meaning
should not be elaborated upon in the instructions given by the court. It is presumed that
jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand the meaning of ordinary words

"

State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89,94 (Utah 1981) (quoting State v. Dav. 572 P.2d 703, 705
(Utah 1977).
Furthermore, even if a jury instruction on intent had been required, jury
instruction nos. 7 and 8, taken together, instructed the jury on intent. The jury was
instructed that "in every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint operation

14

of the act and intent" (R. 58, jury instruction no. 8, Addendum B). The jury was also
given the statutory definitions of "intentional" and "knowing" conduct (R. 57, jury
instruction no. 7, Addendum B). "We review jury instructions in their entirety and will
affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case." State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1231 (Utah 1997); see also
Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396; State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998); State
v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929,934 (Utah App. 1991).
Here, the trial court accurately instructed the jury on the mens rea of forgery using
the statutory language. Therefore, although the court also instructed the jury regarding
"intent," the court was not required to do so. Under any analysis, the instructions were
correct.4

4

Because the trial court correctly instructed the jury, defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel argument fails. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a defendant must show (1) that trial counsel's performance was objectively
deficient, and (2) that a reasonable probability existed that, absent the deficient conduct,
more favorable outcome would have occurred at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995). Since the trial
court did not err, defendant cannot show deficient performance or, logically, prejudice.
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 722 (Utah App. 1997). Therefore, even if defendant had
adequately briefed his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and even if the record
were adequate to allow review of the claim, it would fail on the merits.
However, the claim is inadequately briefed. Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, a party to an appeal must provide an argument containing the
"contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." "Utah courts routinely decline to
consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App.
1998); see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). Furthermore, the

15

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no important, novel, or complex issues of law, the
State does not request oral argument, nor that a published opinion issue.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 5

day of fUx^KA

2000.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

CATHERINE M. JOHNSON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

record is inadequate to allow review of claim. Although 12 witnesses testified at trial, the
record on appeal contains a transcript of only one witness's testimony, and does not
include counsel's opening or closing statements (R. 41,153). Because the record is
incomplete, this Court cannot review trial counsel's performance as a whole to determine
whether counsel's alleged deficiencies in reality reflected a legitimate trial strategy.
16
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UN l O i c r i K D l JUJUlL,IAJLOi51KlUl t U U K i Or T H E S T A T E OF

UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVINA.BOSLEY,
Defendant.

HON- B E N H. H A D F I E L D
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No- 971100120

This matter is before the Court pursuant to defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The Court
has received and reviewed the Motion, the Supporting Memorandum and Attachment, the defendant's
Affidavit and the Responsefromthe State. Oral argument was held on this Motion January 25,1999 and
the matter was taken under advisement
Defendant essentially asserts two arguments in support of his Motion for New Trial. These
assertions are, in essence, the same argument, that is that the defendant did not have "effective assistance
of counsel" during the trial.
Thefirstassertion is that the State presented testimony from Officer Cosgrove to the effect that
defendant admitted writing the checks in question, which were identified at trial as Exhibits 1 and 2.
Defendant now argues that a handwriting expert should have been procured to offer evidence indicating
that defendant did not write those checks. An analysis of the prosecution's evidence will show that the
prosecution witness did not claim that defendant wrote the checks. Rather, he claimed that defendant
"admitted writing the checks." Officer Cosgrove never offered his opinion as to whether the defendant
actually wrote the checks.
The defendant was charged with two counts of forgery. Under the law, it is not necessary that
the State prove the defendant wrote the checks. In examining Exhibits 1 and 2, even an untrained observer
would conclude that the faces of the checks were not written by the same person who endorsed "Kevin A.
Bosley" on the back of the checks. The opinion now proffered by the defense that a forensic expert has
concluded defendant "probably did not produce" the writing on the front of the checks is unremarkable.
There is no evidence to suggest this jury concluded the defendant wrote thefrontof the checks. The jury
did not need to even decide that issue. The jury was made well aware of that through the questions which
were issued by the jury and the answers provided. The jury's second question was, "What does it mean to
utter a check?" The response given to the jury was "utter means to put or send into circulation" (as a check
or, for example, putting into circulation is uttering a check).
Trial defense counsel's decision not to secure an expert regarding handwriting samples was
sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The second argument appears to be that the failure to provide an instruction concerning intent,
as propounded by current defense counsel, constituted ineffective assistance. The Court has reviewed the
instructions and concludes that the jury was properly and sufficiently instructed concerning intent. The
second question posed by the jury and response provided are as follows:
Jury Question:

Did Kevin Bosley have to physically write and sign the

names of the other people on the checks to be found guilty or does he just
have to be aware that they were forged?
Response: The State must only prove those elements identified in Instruction
4 and Instruction 5.
Instruction 4 and 5 were the elements for counts one and two, the two separate forgery charges.
The third element, in each of those accounts, stated the following: "did, with a purpose to defraud."
Defense counsel now argues that there is no indication to the jury that the defendant must have
intended to defraud. Black's Law Dictionary Revised Fourth Edition, defines "intent" as follows:
"Intent. Intent in legal sense is purpose to use particular means to effect
certain result... meaning, purpose, signification, intendment,"
Black's Law Dictionary further defines "purpose" and "purposely" as follows:
"Purpose. That which one sets before him to accomplish; an end, intention,
or aim ..."
"Purposely. Intentionally, designedly, consciously,..."
The words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court concludes that they are, therefore,
for purposes of this offense and these instructions synonymous. The jury was properly instructed
concerning intent.
The defendant has not shown a legal basis for a new trial and the Motion is denied.
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Addendum B

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

You are instructed that the defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the
offence of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree.
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery , a Felony of the 3rd
Degree, you must find each of the following elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt:
COUNT I
1.

That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley

2.

On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah,

3.

Did with a purpose to defraud,

4.

Utter a check in the amount of $5000

5.

On which the name of the maker had been forged.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved each of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Forgery,
a Felony of the 3rd Degree.
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proved each of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you mustfindthe defendant not guilty of Forgery,
a Felony of the 3rd Degree.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£

You are instructed that the defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the
offence of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree.
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery , a Felony of the 3rd
Degree, you must find each of the following elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

COUNTH

1.

That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley

2.

On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah,

3.

Did with a purpose to defraud,

4.

Utter a check in the amount of $250

5.

On which the name of the maker had been forged.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved each of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Forgeiy,
a Felony of the 3rd Degree.
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proved each of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Forgery,
a Felony of the 3rd Degree.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*7

A person engages in conduct intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct, or to
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Conduct means an act or omission. An
act is a voluntary bodily movement.

INSTRUCTION NO.

9.

You are instructed that in every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint
operation of the act and intent. The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances
connected with the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.

